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A. A four dimensional system is considered describing the competition of
three predator species for a single prey species. The predators functional response
is of a generalized Holling III type. Predators begin to grow at the same threshold
quantity as prey does. The system has a two dimensional simplex of equilibria
which is attracting at low values of the carrying capacity K but gets destabilized as
K grows and the predators that are less r-strategists lose ground.
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1. I
The phenomenon of zip bifurcation was introduced by Farkas [2] in 1984 in con-
junction with a system describing the competition of two predator species for a prey.
It was assumed that the threshold quantities of prey at which predator growth rate
became positive were equal. As a consequence, the system had a one dimensional
continuum of equilibria (a “zip”). One of the predators could be identified as a K-
strategist, the other one as an r-strategist. A species is called a K-strategist, roughly,
if it has a relatively low growth rate and may survive with low carrying capacity K.
A species is an r-strategist if it has a high growth rate (for more see [6]). Clearly, the
model was not a structurally stable one, however, it illustrated the intuitively evident
fact that at low values of the carrying capacity K both predators might survive but as
K grew the K-strategist lost ground and only the r-strategist survived with the prey.
Later a whole class of models were characterized that showed the phenomenon [3],
see also [4], and some applications were published, see e.g. [5]. Recently [1] the
phenomenon was generalized to a four dimensional system that arose in economy-
politology. In this case the system had a two dimensional surface of equilibria that
got destabilized as the value of a parameter was increased. We called this a velcro
bifurcation. In general, suppose that a system of autonomous differential equations
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has a two dimensional differentiable manifold of Liapunov stable equilibria and in
an interval of a bifurcation parameter this manifold is an attractor of the system. In-
creasing, say, the bifurcation parameter a curve sweeps through the manifold and the
equilibria that are left behind get destabilized, i. e., the part of the manifold that is
left behind becomes a repeller while the part yet untouched remains an attractor. In
this case we say that the system undergoes a velcro bifurcation.
In the present paper we consider three predator species that compete for a sin-
gle prey. The functional response of the predators is assumed to be of a gener-
alized Holling III type. The Holling III functional response that is of the form
S 2/(S 2 + a2),where S is the prey quantity, has the property that up to a certain value
the growth of S is increasing predator efficiency and, as a consequence, the predator
has a stabilizing effect on the population, above this value predator efficiency is de-
creasing (see May [6]). Here we replace Holling III by S n/(S n + an) where n > 1
is an arbitrary integer. This generalized Holling III functional response preserves the
basic properties but is somewhat finer.
In the next Section we introduce the model and establish the conditions under
which a velcro bifurcation occurs and in Section 3 we present some computer simu-
lations.
2. V B
Let us denote the quantity of prey at time t by S (t), the quantity of predator i by
xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 and consider the following system that describes the competition of
the three predator species for the prey
˙S = rS (1 − S/K) −
3∑
i=1
mixi
S n
ani + S n
,
x˙i = mixi
S n
ani + S n
− dixi, i = 1, 2, 3 (2.1)
where r,K,mi, ai, di > 0 are the intrinsic growth rate of prey, the carrying capacity,
the maximal birth rate, the half saturation constant and the death rate of predator i,
respectively, and n ≥ 2 is an integer. In absence of predation prey grows up to the
value of K. If predators are present prey quantity is less. As S tends to infinity, per
capita predator birth rate tends to mi (the shape of the predator functional response is
a sigmoid one). For the survival of predator i it is , clearly, necessary that the maximal
birth rate be larger than the death rate:
mi > di, i = 1, 2, 3. (2.2)
This will be assumed in the sequel. When S = ai, then the per capita growth rate
is half of the maximal. The lower the half saturation constant ai is, the less prey is
needed for the maintenance of the predator. Therefore, we shall consider a predator
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with low half saturation constant a K-strategist. We assume that
a1 < a2 < a3. (2.3)
Predator i begins to grow only if the right hand side of equation (2.1)i is positive.
This is the case if S > S i := ai n
√
di/(mi − di) = ai n
√
1/(bi − 1), where bi = mi/di > 1.
We shall assume that the threshold values of prey are equal for the three predators:
S T := S 1 = S 2 = S 3. (2.4)
Conditions (2.3) and (2.4) imply that
b1 < b2 < b3. (2.5)
We shall consider a species with a high ratio of maximal birth rate to death rate as
an r-strategist. Thus, in our system, predator 1 may be considered a K-strategist and
predator 3 an r-strategist. Predator 2 is in between the two.
Applying the conditions above, we can rewrite our system in the form
˙S = rS (1 − S/K) −
3∑
i=1
mixi
S n
ani + S n
,
x˙i = βi
(S n − S nT )
ani + S n
xi, i = 1, 2, 3, (2.6)
where βi = mi−di > 0. Clearly, the positive orthant of (S , x1, x2, x3) space is invariant.
We shall consider system (2.6) restricted to 4+.
Lemma 1. System (2.1) and, as a consequence, (2.6) is dissipative, i. e., all solu-
tions are bounded.
P. Let us add the four equations of (2.1):
(S + x1 + x2 + x3)· = rS (1 − S/K) −
3∑
i=1
dixi.
If S > K or if S ≤ K but ∑3i=1 dixi > rK then this derivative is negative. This means
that the trajectories of the system cross the hyperplanes
S + x1 + x2 + x3 = C
from outside to inside if C is sufficiently large. 
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The equilibria of system (2.6) are (0, 0, 0, 0), (K, 0, 0, 0) and the points of the two-
dimensional plane
E :=
(S , x1, x2, x3) ∈ 4+ : S = S T , 3∑
i=1
miS nT xi
ani + S
n
T
= rS T (1 − S T/K),
xi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, 3

the latter having points in 4+ only if
S T < K. (2.7)
We are to study now the stability of these equilibria. The Jacobian of the system is
(summation goes always from 1 to 3)
J =

r (1 − 2S/K) − n ∑ miani S n−1 xi(ani +S n)2 − m1S nan1+S n − m2S nan2+S n − m3S nan3+S n
nβ1
S n−1
(an1+S n) x1
β1(S n−S nT )
an1+S n
0 0
nβ2
S n−1
(an2+S n) x2 0
β2(S n−S nT )
an2+S n
0
nβ3
S n−1
(an3+S n) x3 0 0
β3(S n−S nT )
an3+S n

.
Substituting (0, 0, 0, 0) we obtain easily that the origin is unstable (a hyperbolic
saddle).
Substituting (K, 0, 0, 0) we obtain similarly that this equilibrium is asymptotically
stable if K < S T and it is unstable, a hyperbolic saddle if K > S T . The result is in
accordance to what has been said before. If the carrying capacity, i. e., the lim sup
of prey abundance is less than the threshold value above which predator’s quantity
may grow, then the predators die out. If (2.7) holds, then the predators may survive.
This is precisely the case when the system has equilibria in the interior of the positive
orthant. (2.7) will be assumed in the sequel.
We turn now to the stability problem of the points in E. Substituting the coordi-
nates of an arbitrary point of E into the Jacobian, a straightforward calculation leads
one to the following characteristic polynomial:
D(λ) = λ2
(
λ2 + λ
(
nS n−1T
∑ miani xi
(ani + S nT )2
− r (1 − 2S T/K)
)
+nS 2n−1T
∑ miβixi
(ani + S nT )2
)
.
This means that each equilibrium point in E has zero as a double eigenvalue and
two eigenvalues with real part negative or positive depending on the fact whether the
quadratic polynomial in brackets is a stable polynomial or inversely. This polynomial
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is stable iff the coefficient of λ is positive, i. e., the equilibrium point in E has two
eigenvalues with negative real part if and only if∑ miani xi
(ani + S nT )2
>
r
nS n−1T
(1 − 2S T/K) . (2.8)
Note that (2.8) holds obviously for each point in E if S T < K < 2S T . In what follows
K will be considered the bifurcation parameter.
Theorem 1. Under the conditions (2.2) – (2.4), (2.7) if at a point of E (2.8) holds,
then this point is stable in the Liapunov sense and a neighbourhood of this point is
attractive in the sense that it has a tubular neighbourhood from where it attracts the
solutions; if the inequality (2.8) is inverted, then the point is unstable.
P. If (2.8) holds, then the equilibrium has a two dimensional centre manifold
(clearly the simplex E) and a two dimensional stable manifold, and by continuity the
same holds for each equilibrium in a neighbourhood of the point. The stable man-
ifolds of the equilibria in this neighbourhood fill in a tubular neighbourhood in 4+
(this can be proven analogously to how this was done in [2]), thus, from this tubular
neighbourhood every solution tends to some equilibrium in this neighbourhood. The
unstability proposition is obvious. 
Consider (2.8) with the equality sign:∑ miani xi
(ani + S nT )2
=
r
nS n−1T
(1 − 2S T/K) . (2.9)
This is the equation of a two dimensional plane in the S = S T section of 4+. If
K is small (≤ 2S T ), then (2.8) holds, obviously, in each point of E, i. e., E is an
attractor of the system. However, if K is increased, the plane (2.9) may intersect E
and, as a consequence, the stability properties of the equilibria in E may change. The
following theorem explains what happens.
Theorem 2. Suppose that conditions (2.2) – (2.4) and (2.7) hold and assume that
a1 < a2 < a3 < S T/
n√
n − 1; (2.10)
(1) if K ∈
(
S T ,
((n−2)an1−2S nT )S T
(n−1)an1−S nT
)
, then each equilibrium in E is stable in the Lia-
punov sense and E is an attractor of system (2.6);
(2) if K ∈
( ((n−2)an3−2S nT )S T
(n−1)an3−S nT ,∞
)
, then all these equilibria are unstable and E is a
repeller;
(3) if K is increased from one end to the other one of the interval
(
(n − 2) an1 − 2S nT
)
S T
(n − 1) an1 − S nT
,
(
(n − 2) an3 − 2S nT
)
S T
(n − 1) an3 − S nT
 ,
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then the line of intersection of E and the plane (2.9) is traveling through E
from the vertex on the axis x1 to the vertex on the axis x3 and the equilibria
left behind get destabilized; for
K ∈

(
(n − 2) an1 − 2S nT
)
S T
(n − 1) an1 − S nT
,
(
(n − 2) an3 − 2S nT
)
S T
(n − 1) an3 − S nT

this line of intersection divides E into two parts, “the lower one” is a repeller
and “the upper one” is an attractor of the system (see Figure 1 in the next
Section), i. e., the system undergoes a velcro bifurcation.
P. Let us denote the respective coordinate intercepts of E by (xE1, 0, , 0),
(0, xE2, 0), (0, 0, xE3) and those of the plane (2.9) by (xs1, 0, 0), (0, xs2, 0), (0, 0, xs3).
A simple calculation yields
xEi =
ani + S
n
T
mi
r
S n−1T
(1 − S T/K) ;
xsi =
(ani + S nT )2
mia
n
i
1
n
r
S n−1T
(1 − 2S T/K) , i = 1, 2, 3.
Introduce the notation
Ki =
(
(n − 2) ani − 2S nT
)
S T
(n − 1) ani − S nT
, i = 1, 2, 3.
By condition (2.10) the denominator and a fortiori the numerator are negative, hence
Ki is positive, further, as the function f (a) = ((n−2)a
n−2S nT )S T
(n−1)an−S nT is increasing in the
interval a ∈ [0, S T/ n
√
n − 1) we have
2S T < K1 < K2 < K3. (2.11)
Now, a simple calculation shows that for 2S T < K < Ki we have xEi < xsi, and
xEi = xsi when K = Ki. This implies that for 2S T < K < K1 the plane (2.9) is
“below” E and reaches E at xE1 = xs1 when K = K1. (As K is increased both
planes are displaced parallelly). This implies that for 2S T < K < K1 (2.8) holds for
every equilibrium in E. As K is increased further the plane (2.9) cuts into E, reaches
xE2 = xs2 at K = K2, reaches xE3 = xs3 at K = K3 and after that cuts the plane of
E outside the positive orthant so that now E will be “below” the plane (2.9). In the
process, condition (2.8) holds with an inverted inequality sign in the part of E which
is already below the plane (2.9). This means that the equilibria on this part of the
plane have a two dimensional unstable manifold which fill a neighbourhood of this
part of E. This proves the Theorem. 
Note that Ki is positive also if S T n
√
2/(n − 2) < a1 < a2 < a3, n > 2, however, in
this case the plane (2.9) never reaches E.
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Note also that in case of the classical Holling III functional response, i. e., n = 2
condition (2.10) is just a1 < a2 < a3 < S T , the half saturation constants must be less
than the threshold value of prey abundance. This means that predator birth rate half
the maximal is not sufficient for predator survival. In case of the generalized Holling
III functional response the half saturation constants must be even less in order to
experience velcro bifurcation.
3. C I
In this Section a numerical example will be presented. The classical Holling III
functional response will be considered, i. e., n = 2. The following parameter values
are chosen:
r = 1, m1 = 5, m2 = 6, m3 = 7, a1 = 0.5 < a2 =
√
0.5 < a3 =
√
0.75
d1 = d2 = d3 = 4.
As a consequence
β1 = 1, β2 = 2, β3 = 3, b1 = 5/4 < b2 = 6/4 < b3 = 7/4, S T = 1.
Conditions (2.2)–(2.4) and (2.10) hold and the system is
˙S = S (1 − S/K) − 5x1S 2/(0.25 + S 2) − 6x2S 2/(0.5 + S 2)
− 7x3S 2/(0.75 + S 2), (3.1)
x˙1 =
S 2 − 1
0.25 + S 2
x1, x˙2 = 2
S 2 − 1
0.5 + S 2
x2, x˙3 = 3
S 2 − 1
0.75 + S 2
x3.
E = {(S , x1, x2, x3) ∈ 4+ : S = 1, x1 + x2 + x3 = 0.25(1 − 1/K), xi ≥ 0}.
The equation of the plane (2.9) is now
x1/0.375 + x2/0.225 + x3/0.175 = 1. (3.2)
The critical values of K are: K1 = 2.667, K2 = 4, K3 = 8. Condition (2.11) is
satisfied. We choose K = 5. By this, clearly, the points of the plane of E on the axes
x1 and x2 have already been destabilized, but the vertex on the axis x3 is still stable.
Figure 1 shows the plane of E cut by the plane (3.2). (The figures were produced
by Maple V. The coordinates S , x1, x2, x3 are denoted on the figures by x, y, z, w,
respectively).
We choose now two sets of initial values. The first (denoted by A) is near the
destabilized part of E (with x3 coordinate small). The second (denoted by B) is near
the still attractive part of E (with x3 coordinate relatively large). The coordinates of
(A) are given by (S (0), x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) = (1, 0.08, 0.08, 0.06), and the coordinates
of (B) are given by (S (0), x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) = (1, 0.01, 0.05, 0.16). Figures 2, 3, and
4 show, respectively, the x1, x2, and x3 coordinates of the solution. As can be seen, the
solution initiating at (A) tends to an equilibrium on the still attractive portion of E far
192 M. FARKAS, E. S ´AEZ, AND I. SZ ´ANT ´O
F 1. Plane of equilibria partly destabilized
(B)
(A)
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
y(t)
50 100 150 200
t
F 2. x1 coordinates of solutions (A) and (B)
from (A) after exhibiting strong oscillations. In contrast, the solution corresponding
to (B) tends to an equilibrium on the still attractive portion of E near (B).
Figure 3 shows the x2 = z coordinate of these solutions. The behaviour is similar
to the previous one.
Figure 4 shows the x3 = w coordinate of these solutions. For solution (A) it is
increasing considerably, for solution (B) it remains near the initial value.
It is an interesting question what the solutions do when K > K3, i. e., when already
all the equilibria in 4+ have been destabilized. It is easy to see that the equilibrium
point (S T , 0, 0, xEi) which is the “last stable one” undergoes a degenerate Andronov–
Hopf bifurcation as K is increased through K3. The fundamental Andronov–Hopf
bifurcation theorem (see, e. g., [4]) does not apply since at the critical value K3 of
VELCRO BIFURCATION IN COMPETITION MODELS 193
(A)
(B)
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
z(t)
50 100 150 200
t
F 3. x2 coordinates of solutions (A) and (B)
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F 4. x3 coordinates of solutions (A) and (B)
the bifurcation parameter this equilibrium has a double zero eigenvalue and a pair
of imaginary eigenvalues. Computer simulations show that the closed orbit of the
bifurcating periodic solution attracts solutions initiating in 4+\E.
4. C
Three predator species compete for a single prey species. The prey species fol-
lows logistic dynamics with carrying capacity K in the absence of predation. The
functional responses of the predators are of generalized Holling III type, i. e., in-
crease of prey increases predator efficiency for relatively low prey abundance. All
the three predators begin to grow at the same threshold quantity of prey denoted S T .
Predator 2 is more an r-strategist and less a K-strategist than predator 1, predator 3
is more an r-strategist and less a K-strategist than predator 2. We distinguish three
values of K, denoted herein as S T < K1 < K2 < K3. For K < S T , there are no
equilibria corresponding to the survival of the predators. For K > S T the system has
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F 5. K = 11, trajectories tending to limit cycle in the (x, w) plane
an attracting simplex of equilibria in the positive orthant of the 4-dimensional space.
This means that solutions tend to a point on this simplex determined by the initial
conditions, i. e., the three predator species may coexist with the prey in the long run.
Naturally, if neglected and stochastic effects are taken into consideration the limit
point may drift on the simplex and this may lead to the extinction of one or two of
the predators. As K is increased beyond K1, the equilibria on the simplex begin to
lose their stability starting with those that represent dominance of predator 1, the K-
strategist, and then proceeding on with those that represent dominance of predator 2.
This part of the simplex becomes a repeller of the system and all solutions tend to an
equilibrium that represents dominance of predator 3, the r-strategist. For values of K
larger than K3 the first two predators disappear and only predator 3, the r-strategist
survives with the prey. This is the phenomenon that we call a velcro bifurcation. The
results support the intuitively expected fact that abundance of food is advantageous
for r-strategists, and under such conditions a K-strategist loses because its positive
properties are of no use. However, if the parameters of the system can be estimated
with some exactness, the model tells us at what value of the carrying capacity the K-
strategist and also the second predator begins to lose ground and at what value they
disappear.
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